The first problem in this interpretation is that the relevant clauses, considered either independently or grouped together, did not originally have the semantic implications envisaged by unified executive theorists. Such clauses were widespread in the early constitutions of the state, which also established relations between governors, as heads of state and public authorities. Instead of giving governors sole executive control over state administration, they almost all shared oversight of bureaucracy across different branches of government — the governor, the legislature and, in some states, the courts. Original proponents of a unitary executive reading the Federal Constitution often rejected the interpretive importance of pre-1787 state constitutions, on the grounds that these early texts exercised only formal statements on the separation of powers, while they presented mostly to the framers examples of governmental structures to be avoided. The problem with this attitude is that the constitutions of the state, drafted in the first decades after 1789, continued to use the same clauses as those in Article II at that time to describe state governments, where governors continued to lack uniform control. An in-depth study of state constitutions and state administrative practices among them therefore believe in all the “single executive” of Article II which claims to be based solely on contemporary understanding of the text. Unlike previous studies, this article takes a more direct approach to comparing congressional contracts and executive agreements, which do not require equally strong assumptions. At the heart of the study of the differences between the two political instruments is a simple question: if a particular treaty is concluded as a treaty between the United States and a partner country, will it result in a different outcome than the agreement reached as an agreement between Congress and the executive branch? If the answer is yes, it indicates that the treaty is qualitatively different from the agreement between Congress and the executive branch. If the answer is no, the content of treaties and agreements between Congress and the executive branch of Congress is similar, and their use could be motivated solely by circumstances that are not relevant to the content of the agreement.
It is therefore instructive to postpone empirical attention and to ascertain whether the application of the contract is related to a different outcome of the executive agreement of Congress. While the contracts and agreements between Congress and the executive branch do not differ qualitatively, it seems difficult to rationalize the reasons why negotiators sometimes show such an interest in choosing the instrument. As a result, some scholars seem to criticize the alleged lack of usefulness of contracts. Arguments come in different forms; Some believe that the use of the treaty by a president would show a particularly high degree of commitment, and the other note 15, that the struggle for Senate approval could encourage the government to disclose valuable information truthfully, footnote 16 or that the greater stability of Senate preferences helps to ensure long-term compliance. Footnote 17 All of these reports have in common the assumption that treaties, while politically more costly than congressional executive agreements, provide certain benefits to the parties, justifying their sustainability as a valuable United States.