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Annual Review of Political Science, 3 (1), 25-42 Mitchell, R.B. (2008). Evaluation of the performance of environmental institutions: what should be evaluated and how to evaluate them? In: O. Young, L. King, H. Schroeder (Eds.), Institutions and Environmental Change (p. 79-114). Cambridge: Mit Press. Many argue that international environmental agreements (IEAs) can alter state cost-benefit analyses by providing important information on the cost of environmental degradation. The IEA can thus contribute to effectively reducing environmental pollution. However, previous attempts to measure institutional effectiveness empirically have found it difficult to provide credible estimates because they have not provided convincing counter-ctivity.
This study empirically assesses the effectiveness of an important example of an international environmental institution, the Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution Agreement (LRTAP). It presents a transparent identification strategy in light of recent progress in the causal literature and presents evidence of the ineffectiveness of the LRTAP in changing the behaviour of Member States with regard to anthropogenic emissions of two substances (NO x and SO2). By deriding and illustrating the use of differentiation differences (DID) design in the context of IEAs, this study provides a general methodological kit to draw causal conclusions about the effectiveness of international environmental institutions. Breitmeier, H., Underdal, A., Young, O. R. (2011). The effectiveness of international environmental regimes: comparative and opposite results of quantitative research. International Studies Review, 13, 1-27. J. D. Fearon.
Negotiations, implementation and international cooperation. International Organization, 52 (02), 269-305. Painter, K. G. (1989). The game of rain. In: H. Folmer – E. van Ierland (Eds.), evaluation methods and political and environmental economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Helm, C., Sprinz, D (2000). Measuring the effectiveness of international environmental systems. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44 (5), 630-652. Mitchell, R.B., Deane, G. (2009). Comparison of institutional influence: the relative effectiveness of three environmental agreements. The discussion paper. Ringquist, E. J., Kostadinova, T. (2005).
Assessing the effectiveness of international environmental agreements: the case of the 1985 Helsinki Protocol. American Journal of Political Science, 49(1), 86-102. Bratberg, E., Tjotta, S., Oines, T. (2005). Do voluntary international environmental agreements work?. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 50 (3), 583-597. Achieving the effectiveness of many global environmental problems requires voluntary cooperation between sovereign countries because of the public good of pollution reduction.